Organizational Structures

Type Spaces

Harsanyi, J., “Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian agents, part I: the basic model,” Management Science, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 159-182, 1967.

Harsanyi, J., “Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian agents, part II: Bayesian equilibrium points,” Management Science, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 320-224, 1968.

Harsanyi, J., “Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian agents, part III: the basic probability distribution of the game,” Management Science, vol. 14, no. 7, 486-502, 1968.

Myerson, R.B., “Comments on ‘Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players’,” Management Science, vol. 50, no. 12, pp. 1818-1824, 2004.

Mertens, J.-F. and Zamir, S., “Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 1-29, 1995.

Organization Motifs

Fairtlough, G., The Three Ways of Getting Things Done: Hierarchy, Heterarchy and Responsible Autonomy in Organizations, Triarchy Press, 2007.

Mechanism Selection Frameworks

Kokar, M.M., Tomasik, J.A. and Weyman, J., “Formalizing classes of information fusion systems,” Information Fusion, vol. 5, pp. 189-202, 2004.

Schotter, A., “A practical person’s guide to mechanism selection: some lessons from experiemental economics,” in Organization with Incomplete Information: Essays in Economic Analysis, 1998.

Contract Theory

Tirole, J., The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press, 2006.

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